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Abstract: The thoughts that an individual has about the future contribute substantially to their life 
satisfaction in a positive or negative direction. This is a result found via five different methods, some 
of which control for personality and disposition and the potential endogeneity of thoughts and life 
satisfaction. The reduction in life satisfaction experienced by individuals who report being 
pessimistic is greater than that for well-known objective statuses like unemployment. Including 
individuals’ thoughts about the future substantially increases the explanatory power of standard life 
satisfaction models. Life satisfaction is made up of objective and subjective factors and methods 
exist to account for their potential endogeneity to enhance our understanding of well-being. This 
investigation is an example of such an analysis combining a subjective factor, thoughts about the 
future (treated as endogenous), with more standard objective factors to aid understanding regarding 
well-being. 
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Zukunftsangst! Fear of the future and its impact on life satisfaction. 
“The mind that is anxious about the future is miserable” Seneca 
“He who fears he will suffer already suffers what he shall fear” Montaigne 
1. Introduction 
The quotes above provide a succinct summary of this investigation. Using German panel data 
evidence is presented that people who are pessimistic about the future, compared with people who 
are quite optimistic, are much less satisfied with life. The size of the effect is substantial, with the 
impact being approximately a loss of one happiness point on the German Socioeconomic Panel’s 
(SOEP) eleven point scale. This represents a larger impact than that of unemployment or divorce. 
Conversely, there is a small life satisfaction premium associated with feeling optimistic about the 
future compared to being merely quite optimistic. Moreover, including a measure of an individual’s 
fear of the future substantially increases the explanatory power of well-being equations.  
An inspiration for this research is the finding that the impact on happiness from fearing crime is 
often greater than actually being a crime victim. In an analysis of the well-being of people who live in 
capital cities and those who do not, Piper (2014a) shows that individuals from Athens, Berlin and 
Vienna have a greater fear of being a victim of burglary or violence and, furthermore, it seems that 
this is the reason for their lower happiness, on average, than that enjoyed by their non-capital city 
living compatriots.1. Conversely, having been a victim of crime has no statistically significant impact 
on happiness, suggesting that fears play a substantial role for well-being. Within the economics of 
happiness literature this is largely untested. Thus the contribution of this paper is to examine the 
role of a fear of the future for life satisfaction, and to demonstrate that inclusion of such fears 
substantially increases the explanatory powers of the typical equations estimated in well-being 
research. A further contribution is th use of a model which can incorporate potentially endogenous 
variables, something that should be more widely considered within the well-being literature. 
                                                          
1
 This study employed the European Social Survey (ESS) where the well-being question asked directly about 
individual happiness (‘how happy are you’). Throughout this investigation, I follow much of the economic 
literature, and use well-being, life satisfaction and happiness interchangeably. 
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Another inspiration for this research comes from recent work which attempts to understand the 
effect of an individual’s past, including family background and teacher assessments of the individual 
when a child, on current well-being. Frijters et al. (2014) and Layard et al. (forthcoming) are two 
examples from within the ‘economics of happiness’ literature that investigate this and find that any 
direct effects are minor, though their inclusion increases the R2 value. Indirect effects are certainly 
possible, though challenging to isolate. The childhoods of individuals, including parental marital 
status, may have an influence on their own adult marital status, and hence affect their life 
satisfaction. This is certainly plausible, but hard to assess given most current data. Rather than 
investigating the effect of the past, this study takes the different angle of trying to examine the 
impact of the future on current life satisfaction. One way to do this is to consider what individuals 
think about the future: are they optimistic or pessimistic about it? And then to ask what that might 
mean for wellbeing. A dynamic panel assessment of life satisfaction indicates that it is largely 
contemporaneous (Piper 2014b), which is suggestive that the thoughts of an individual about their 
future affect their well-being now. Becchetti et al. (2012) investigate life satisfaction via eleven sub-
components and find that answers to the question “How often do you look forward to another 
day?” are an important contributor to an understanding of well-being. Similarly, this investigation 
presents evidence that such perceptions matter for well-being, and considerably so. This means that 
individuals’ fears and hopes should be more widely considered in well-being investigations than they 
are now - the increase in explanatory power over ‘standard’ well-being equations can approach 40% 
- when the data exists.2 They are important determinants of current well-being and, in terms of size, 
of larger effect than unemployment which, as many studies show (this one too) is a major negative 
influence on well-being.   
Work within economics has acknowledged the possibility that the future may have an impact on 
current well-being. Some recent examples follow. Haucap and Heimeshoff (2014) investigate the 
causal effect of studying economics on well-being and find that perceived good future job prospects 
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 This figure was nearer 60% in some alternative specifications. 
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(which they suggest could also be a proxy for future income) are positively associated with student 
life satisfaction scores. Similarly Hetschko et al. (2014), using the SOEP, investigate, in part, the 
possibility that more uncertain future income and employment prospects can impact current well-
being. Such issues are also investigated by Grunow (2014), who, also with the SOEP, investigates the 
impact of future job expectations on current life satisfaction finding that, broadly, unexpected 
unemployment has a larger impact on life satisfaction than expected unemployment. Using a wave 
of the SOEP, Grözinger and Matiaske (2004) investigate, in part, the impact of regional 
unemployment on overall life satisfaction and argue that the higher regional unemployment is the 
higher the fear about future unemployment is and thus the lower individual life satisfaction. 
Two recent papers link the future and the present via climate change, with expectations about 
climate change demonstrated to have an impact on well-being. Osberghaus and Kühling (2014) 
investigate this and provide robust evidence that worsening expectations about future climate 
change negatively affect well-being, though the size of the effect is not large. Similarly, Alem and 
Kolmer (2014) find, with Ethiopian data spanning two waves, that subjective well-being is negatively 
affected by climate variability which they argue can be seen as a proxy for future income 
uncertainty. For Ethiopian farmers, they assert, periods of climate variability is linked with more 
uncertain future income, and this increased uncertainty about the future lowers current well-being.  
Regarding fear itself, it has recently been studied in the context of immigration (Mocan and Raschke 
2014) as well as crime (Dustmann and Fasani 2013; Cornaglia et al. 2014). An entertaining, more 
general, and full of interesting anecdotes, read regarding fear is provided by Bourke (2005). A brief 
summary of how the rest of the paper is organised follows: the data is described in section 2; the 
results presented in section 3; a discussion of the results and their consequences is found in section 
4; and section 5 concludes.  
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2. Data description 
The main dataset employed here, and the one that all the results (in Section 3) are based on, is the 
SOEP, which asks about fears generally.3 The main question employed asks about the ‘future in 
general’ and individuals can choose whether they are optimistic, more optimistic than pessimistic, 
more pessimistic than optimistic, or pessimistic.4 This question was asked in the following years: 
1990-1993; 1995-1997; 1999; 2005; 2008-2009. The responses have been turned into dummy 
variables and added to a standard well-being equation. As the SOEP is well-known, and frequently 
utilised for well-being work it is not described here; similarly, the other explanatory variables, 
employed here as controls are not explained either. Information regarding the dataset can be found 
online (http://www.diw.de/en/soep); reviews of economic well-being studies can be found in Clark 
et al. (2008), Stutzer and Frey (2012), and Becchetti and Pelloni (2013). The standard correlates here 
are used as control variables: hence the investigation is asking if we take into account marital status, 
labour force status (etc.) what is the impact of an individual’s thoughts about the future on their life 
satisfaction. It is well-known that unemployed people are less satisfied with life, for example, and 
certainly conceivable that they may feel more pessimistic about the future than the employed. Not 
controlling for unemployment may mean that the results reflect the increased pessimism of the 
unemployed and not thoughts about the future itself. A differing impact by income is also possible, 
and hence income is also used as a control variable. Although many of the variables are well-known, 
and somewhat self-explanatory, the labour force status variables need some explanation. The 
‘conventionally’ employed are split into two categories: employed, and government employed. This 
is because of the greater security that German government employees possess, for example in terms 
of job security and also private health insurance, which is more than most other employees. It is 
perhaps likely that these additional benefits will make government employees systematically less 
pessimistic about the future than other employees. Unemployed here refers to individuals who are 
                                                          
3
 Supplementing this is a brief investigation with the latest round of ESS data. See appendix 1 for an 
explanation and some results. 
4
 In German, the middle two categories are ‘eher optimistisch’ and ‘eher pessimistisch’ which can be translated 
as quite optimistic, or rather optimistic, and quite pessimistic or rather pessimistic.  
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in the labour market but cannot find work, in contrast to individuals not in the labour market (which 
might be a house husband, for example). 
There are also control variables for age bands. Schwandt (2014), also using the SOEP, demonstrates 
that young people are more optimistic than older people. He finds this by comparing answers to a 
question about how an individual sees their life satisfaction in five years’ time with its eventual 
realisation. The descriptive statistics largely confirms Schwandt’s finding: the percentage of people 
who respond to the ‘future in general’ question with optimistic falls as age increases (though in this 
study the extremities in terms of age do not fit this pattern). This and other descriptive statistics are 
presented in appendix 2, and provoke interesting thoughts regarding which groups in the population 
are more optimistic and more pessimistic. The differences with the means for the different 
optimism/pessimism categories are quite large (and highly statistically significant). This is 
unsurprising, but a reminder that people’s hopes and fears contribute substantially to their 
(dis)satisfaction with life. Perhaps as expected, they show that the speculation made above about 
the unemployed being systematically more pessimistic than members of other labour force 
categories is supported. As that table shows, overall, the unemployed comprise six percent of the 
sample, but make up five percent of the optimistic group and thirteen percent of the pessimistic 
group. Interestingly, single people are more optimistic than married people: perhaps they hold out 
hope of an excellent marriage whereas married people know already what they have. Individuals 
aged over 61, and there are quite a few of these in this sample, are pretty pessimistic about the 
future in general.5 It is highly likely that their concept of future in general is substantially different 
from individuals nearer the start of adult life. Given this, the results will be tested for robustness 
using both the whole sample and a sample restricted to people of (broadly) working age.  
The aim of the next section is to investigate whether these differences remain after controlling for 
different variables where, as appendix 1 shows, they clearly impact pessimism and optimism. Given 
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 Though this category itself is likely to be very diverse: the mean age of individuals within this age range is just 
over 70, with ten percent of individuals being over 80.  
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all of the correlates that are often studied and regularly demonstrated to have rather consistent 
associations with well-being, is there still a role for hopes and fears about the future to play a role in 
determining current life satisfaction? And if so, how much does their inclusion in ‘standard’ models 
help improve the explanatory power of such models? 
3. Results 
The first set of results show the outcome from pooled cross section estimations. These are found in 
columns 1 and 2 of table 1, with the difference between the two columns being the addition of the 
optimistic-to-pessimistic dummy variables. This enables us to inspect the increase (if any) that these 
variables provide in accounting for the variation of well-being. 
[table 1 here] 
As for the optimistic and two pessimistic dummy variables, the coefficients tell us about the 
difference in the life satisfaction of people who are optimistic about the future, rather pessimistic 
and pessimistic compared to the base category of rather optimistic. So, in column 2, our pooled 
cross-section regression indicates that individuals who are optimistic are, on average, nearly half a 
point higher (on the 11-point well-being scale) compared to individuals who are rather (or quite) 
optimistic. Similarly, rather pessimistic and pessimistic individuals are two-thirds of a point, and one-
and-one-third of a point less satisfied with life than those who are rather optimistic. These are 
substantial values: their size demonstrates a comparable or greater association with life satisfaction 
than most of the control variables. Unlike table A1, the descriptive statistics, here log real income is 
used though using real income makes no difference to the variables of interest (or other controls). 
Regarding the variables employed (largely) as control variables, the coefficients in table 1 are, on the 
whole, unsurprising: they have the expected sign, and are similar to the general findings in the 
literature.  Also, the R2 value has increased representing a 6.4% increase in explained life satisfaction 
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variation: also an important result (which represents an increase of 30% of the originally explained 
variation).  
However, pooled cross section results cannot account for individual unobserved heterogeneity, 
which includes individuals’ personalities and dispositions. Thus, such results should be treated 
cautiously. The next four columns of table 1 exploit the panel nature of the SOEP, and the first two 
of these, the fixed effects (FE) estimates, can be said to control for an individual’s personality and 
disposition with the important caveat that this requires that an individual’s personality and 
disposition to be fixed or slowly moving.  As explained in  section 2, the waves where the ‘future in 
general’ question was asked are fewer than the whole sample, which is the reason for the quite 
large reduction in sample size from the odd numbered columns to the even ones. As shown in table 
1, the fixed effects results for optimism and pessimism are similar to those obtained by pooled OLS, 
though the coefficients are smaller. The coefficients are also smaller for other variables like health 
and unemployment. It is interesting to note that the negative and significant coefficient on 
widowhood (for the two panel data estimations) disappears when the optimistic and two pessimistic 
dummy variables are introduced (i.e. when we move from columns 3 and 5 to 4 and 6 respectively). 
Because fixed effects cannot be generalised out of sample, and variables may not always have 
enough within variation for accurate coefficient determination, these estimates were also 
undertaken with random effects (RE) estimation. Again, table 1 shows that these results are 
supportive of those found via the other methods. Individuals who are optimistic about the future 
enjoy more life satisfaction than individuals who are pessimistic about it. In all three cases – OLS, FE, 
and RE – the variation of life satisfaction explained increases when these variables are included in 
the analysis. This informs us of two things: what people think about the future is important for 
current well-being, and that an inclusion of hopes and fears helps well-being regressions explain 
more of what makes up individual well-being.   
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These results are unchanged when the sample is restricted to individuals aged between 15 and 60. 
Recall the brief discussion about the pessimism of the over sixties above for the reason for the 
restriction. The results from table 1 are also qualitatively unchanged when robust standard errors 
are used. 
This result shows that people who are optimistic about the future enjoy more life satisfaction now. 
Conversely, individuals who are pessimistic about the future report less life satisfaction now. Thus, 
people’s opinions about the ‘future in general’ matter for life satisfaction now, and when these 
opinions are modelled the explanatory power of the model is increased. Taken together, these 
results suggest that Marcus Aurelius and Seneca were right (see opening epigrams). These results 
are also robust to the accuracy (or otherwise) of people’s expectations about their life satisfaction in 
the future.  
As Schwandt (2014) does, I use the individual’s estimate of her happiness in five years’ time and 
compare it to its eventual realisation to have an idea about how accurate their predictions are. The 
idea here is that individuals who make poor (or good) ex-ante statements (in terms of accuracy) 
about their future well-being may have systematically different ways of thinking about the future 
than those who make good (or poor) ex ante comments. 6 Controlling for differences in the accuracy 
of these predictions supports the results obtained in table 1: people who are more optimistic 
(pessimistic) about the future in general are more (less) satisfied with life now (not shown but 
available upon request). 
A further potential robustness test is presented by General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. 
A popular method in many areas of enquiry if not, at present, well-being; some recent examples of 
its use elsewhere are as a tool to help investigate corporate finance (Flannery and Hankins 2013), 
economic growth (Lee et al. 2012), foreign aid (Dutta et al. 2013) and school expenditure and school 
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 This difference may be caused by an individual’s poor ex-ante verdict, but also by the many events that an 
individual experiences between making the verdict and its realisation. Another way to think about this use of 
future well-being prediction is as an attempt, however partial, to try to control for people’s delusions about 
the future. 
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performance (Pugh et al. 2014). With GMM the possibility exists to treat explanatory variables as 
endogenous or exogenous, and this is potentially an issue of great importance for research 
investigating well-being. This opens up the possibility of a better accounting for the associations of 
commonly studied variables with life satisfaction, as well as enabling the examination of more 
subjective values. Presumably, subjective values are as important an explanation for life satisfaction 
as objective ones.   
With well-being the use of GMM (from a statistical diagnostic viewpoint) is more successful with 
some datasets and samples others. The SOEP is one of the popular datasets where, frequently, the 
diagnostic tests do not sufficiently support GMM estimation.7 Here, however, an attempt to use 
GMM was a qualified success though the results should be treated with caution.8 As the estimations 
are computationally intensive and memory hungry, the sample had to be split by gender and the 
waves included reduced (the sample used here concentrates on the waves where there is most data 
for the future in general question, 1990-2000). Furthermore, the equation estimated does not 
include the wave dummy variables which generate far too many instruments for estimation. For 
these reasons the results cannot be directly compared with those in table 1.9  The first two columns 
of table 2 are from static GMM estimation, male and then female, and the second two are from 
dynamic estimation, again male and then female. All four estimates treat the various ‘future in 
general’ dummies as potentially endogenous. In short, this involves using past values (levels and 
changes) to instrument for current values (changes and levels), thus being system GMM, and then 
                                                          
7
 A discussion of the benefits and challenges of GMM estimation (and particularly dynamic panel estimation) in 
a well-being context is provided by Piper (2014b). 
8
 The GMM estimations employed the twostep robust procedure that utilises the Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Without this, standard errors have been demonstrated 
to be biased downwards (Windmeijer 2005). 
9
 This is the case for an additional reason with the dynamic estimates (columns 3 and 4 of table 2) where the 
coefficients obtained reflect contemporaneous associations, unlike those in table 1.  
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diagnostically testing for the exogeneity of the instruments.10  These diagnostic test results are 
presented at the bottom of the table and discussed immediately below. 
[table 2 here] 
The diagnostic tests, set out in the supporting table following the results, indicate that the model is 
statistically appropriate. The figures in the tables are p-values and represent the probability of error 
when rejecting the null of exogenous instruments. Here a value of around 0.05 is cause for concern 
because this means that there only a five percent chance of error when ruling out the exogeneity of 
the instruments; conversely a ninety-five percent chance that the instruments are endogenous. This 
is often misunderstood, and studies often show low p-values and assert that this means that their 
instruments are exogenous.11 The opposite is the case. Because we are trying to rule out correlation 
between the instruments and the error term rather than deciding on the significance of a coefficient 
estimate, Roodman (2009) suggests a ‘common sense’ level of 0.25 is more appropriate though 
should still be viewed with some concern. Here the p-values for the different Hansen tests are higher 
than this common sense level and indicate instruments that can be assumed to be exogenous. 
Researchers can choose which explanatory variables should be considered endogenous and 
exogenous and test for this decision’s statistical appropriateness both overall and for various 
subsets. Here the choice was made to treat the variables of especial interest (the optimism-
pessimism dummies) as endogenous and all others as exogenous: a choice statistically appropriate 
given the diagnostic tests’ outcomes. Many of the rows in the supporting table show which 
diagnostic tests are undertaken (and their results), reflecting the different tests possible for static 
and dynamic panel GMM. The low average observations per person means that the AR (2) tests 
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 The results and test outcomes are also fully supported when restricting the sample to individuals aged 
between 15 and 60. 
11
 An example from the ‘well-being’ area being Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2011), where a p-value of <0.001 is 
presented as a strong indicator of exogenous instruments is instead a strong rejection of this assumption. 
Other well-being studies do not appear to fully understand the diagnostic tests too, as discussed in Piper 
(2014b) 
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cannot be performed, and hence there is no concern with second order correlation of first 
differences (what AR (2) tests for).12  
Researchers can also decide how far back lags can be used for the purposes of instrument creation. 
The last three columns of table 2 are based on estimations which employed ‘default’ 
instrumentation, i.e. starting at the first available lag and going backwards without limit (within the 
dataset). The results and diagnostic test outcomes are robust to this choice. The first column (static 
GMM, males only) is a little more complicated. The results (and diagnostic test) outcomes are based 
on the first two available lags only. Introducing more instruments based on deeper lag lengths 
actually makes the optimistic dummy variable significant (at a 5% level of significance rather than a 
10% level).but this is at the cost of less acceptable diagnostic test results. The discussion now turns 
to the results for the variables of primary interest. 
Regarding the results in table 2, it is important to note that the columns cannot be directly 
compared. The addition of the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic panel estimations means 
that the coefficients in the final two columns represent contemporaneous coefficients controlling for 
the past (which is represented by the lagged dependent variable). The coefficients in the static and 
dynamic columns are similar though because most of the impact of well-being is contemporaneous 
(itself indicated by the small size of the coefficient on lagged life satisfaction). With the static 
analysis, being optimistic about the future in general loses its high statistical significance: both are 
positive and substantial (an increase of very approximately one on the eleven point scale) but the p-
values are 0.096 for males and 0.078 for females. Different choices of lag lengths (for instrument 
creation) can lower these values, though at a cost of lower p-values for some of the diagnostic tests. 
Similarly, using real income rather than its log also increases the significance of the optimism 
coefficient. With the dynamic panel analyses, being optimistic about the future is again significant 
with a confidence level higher than 95% for males and females. Taken together with the static 
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 The argument here being if there is not enough data enabling a test of second order autocorrelation in first 
differences there cannot be second order autocorrelation. 
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results and the results of table 1 (OLS, FE, and RE) this is reasonably strong evidence that being 
optimistic about the future (compared with being quite optimistic) is associated with higher well-
being now.  
The biggest change from table 1 is for the quite pessimistic coefficients; with GMM analysis, and the 
related treatment of these dummies as endogenous, being quite pessimistic about the future is 
insignificantly different from being quite optimistic about the future. However, being pessimistic 
about the future in general is associated with the biggest change in life satisfaction: both the static 
and dynamic analyses find being pessimistic to be strongly negative (statistically significant and a 
substantial quantitative effect) for life satisfaction. Interestingly, perceptions about the future in 
general seem to play a larger role in the life satisfaction of men rather than women, though the life 
satisfaction of women is still substantially affected by such perceptions. Coupled with table 1, these 
results, and the increase in explanatory power they offer, indicate that, where possible, perceptions 
of the future should be modelled in standard well-being estimations. Accounting for endogeneity 
can be important too: when the likely endogeneity of the optimistic-pessimistic variables is taken 
into consideration, being quite pessimistic is insignificant for well-being but being optimistic or 
pessimistic is still important for satisfaction with life.  
The coefficients obtained for the other explanatory variables are in line with expectations from 
previous results in the literature, and those presented in table 1. For example, marriage is positively 
associated with life satisfaction, and unemployment negatively associated. Interesting to note is that 
government employees (‘beamte’) are more satisfied with life than other employees (the reference 
category). The lagged dependent variable deserves comment, and at just under 0.1 is in line with 
previous results, from different samples and datasets, indicating that the direct influence of the past 
is small and that much of what makes up well-being is contemporaneous (see Piper 2014b for a 
more detailed discussion of the lagged dependent variable, its size, and robustness, in well-being 
equations). 
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4. Discussion 
What individuals think about their future appears to have an impact on their current life satisfaction, 
even when accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity and the likely endogeneity of such 
thoughts with life satisfaction. Thoughts are important, and their direction is as expected: individuals 
who are optimistic about the future enjoy more life satisfaction now whereas individuals who are 
pessimistic have, on average, lower life satisfaction now. This was demonstrated with descriptive 
statistics in the appendix as well as 5 different methods for regression analysis in section 3. 
However, while the two methods that treat the optimism-pessimism dummies as endogenous 
demonstrate these effects for optimism and pessimism, people who are quite pessimistic are now 
no longer less satisfied with life on average than people who are quite optimistic. Thus the 
discussion below refers, mainly, to individuals who are optimistic or pessimistic. 
The impact of thoughts may be different for individuals with different personality types. Perhaps 
introverts are more affected by their thoughts about the future than extroverts, for example. Other 
‘Big Five’ personality traits would also be interesting to investigate. For example, how optimism and 
pessimism affects life satisfaction for individuals with differing levels of neuroticism, and does being 
very conscientious have an impact on an individual’s thoughts on the future and their impact on 
well-being? Other interesting questions are easily found. 
The impact of pessimism (when measured in terms of life satisfaction, and as estimated by OLS, FE, 
RE and (static and dynamic GMM) is greater than that of optimism. This is reminiscent of loss 
aversion, where individuals experience losses to a greater degree than they do gains. A phenomenon 
that has recently received more support, in a well-being context, by studies that investigate changes 
in the income of individuals, using the SOEP and the British Household Panel Survey (Boyce et al. 
2014) and changes in GDP (De Neue et al. 2014).13 This latter study employs three different datasets 
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 A notable previous attempt to investigate loss aversion, income and life satisfaction was made by Vendrik 
and Woltjer (2007). 
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and finds, overall, an asymmetric effect on life satisfaction between recessions and periods of 
economic growth, consistent with loss aversion.14 Because of this, the authors argue for policy 
responses that are concerned not just with growth itself, but how that growth occurs. Smooth 
business cycles being preferred to more volatile ones. Furthermore, long periods of smooth growth 
may, somewhat, help lower individuals fear of the future and thus be beneficial to life satisfaction, a 
possibility returned to in the last paragraph of this section. 
Potential policy conclusions stem from this, though they may be difficult to undertake. Here follows 
some brief speculation. Given the importance of individual’s thoughts about the future, 
policymakers could try to create credible reasons for optimism. Macroeconomic initiatives 
encouraging more employment and more employment stability (thus reducing pessimism about the 
future) may help to increase life satisfaction. More stability in terms of economic growth is called for 
by De Neve et al. (2014), as mentioned above, for promoting life satisfaction and the analysis here 
supports such a call. This may affect future happiness as De Neve et al. (2014) show, and is also likely 
to affect current life satisfaction too through its role in changing expectations as the analysis in this 
investigation shows. Similarly, Boyce et al. (2014) make the suggestion regarding individual and 
national incomes that lower, though stable, growth is likely to be preferable for well-being than the 
riskier pursuit of higher incomes. Again, the analysis of this investigation is supportive of such a 
conclusion. Stable growth and income may well generate less pessimism about the future, and 
pessimism plays a greater role in current life satisfaction than optimism.  
This research, with its demonstration of the importance of an individual’s thoughts for life 
satisfaction, indicates that individuals should ‘guard their thoughts’ and do their best to not to get 
trapped into too much negative thinking. This is an aim of cognitive behavioural therapy, and 
something well-known happiness researcher, Richard Layard, has argued should receive more public 
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 De Neve et al. (2014) explicitly include dummies for expectations about the future in one of their robustness 
tests. Their inclusion confirms their result about the asymmetry of GDP changes for life satisfaction, and the 
expectation dummies themselves support the results of section 3 above. There is no discussion, however, 
about the potential endogeneity between life satisfaction and expectations of life in the future. 
15 
 
resources along with  greater funding for, and appreciation of, mental health. In section 3 of Layard 
(2013), he explicitly argues for policymakers to make more use of evidence based methods of 
psychological therapy, with the most researched being ‘cognitive behavioural therapy (or CBT), 
which helps people to reorder their thoughts and thus manage their feelings and behaviour’ (p.6). 
The results here support such an argument.15 Thoughts are important for our current life 
satisfaction, and the analysis above has shown that our thoughts about the future can be 
responsible for a larger impact on well-being than such well-known causes of reduced life 
satisfaction like unemployment.  
5. Concluding remarks 
This investigation has provided strong evidence that peoples’ perceptions of the future in general, 
and particularly their fears of the future, have an impact on their current life satisfaction. This was 
found via by five separate regression models (OLS, FE, RE, static GMM, and dynamic GMM) to take 
into account unobserved individual heterogeneity as well as to recognise, and appropriately deal 
with, the possibility that such perceptions might be endogenous. The result itself is perhaps 
unsurprising, and more remarkable is the size of the effect. Being pessimistic about the future has a 
large negative effect on well-being, larger than such well-known and studied factors like being 
unemployed (and this is after controlling for employment status and other socio-economic 
considerations). In the results of section 3, the largest negative impact on life satisfaction is 
pessimism about the future. This result, and particularly its size, is important. 
The inclusion of an individual’s thoughts about the future in an assessment of well-being is also 
important because of the substantial increase in explanatory power that such an inclusion offers. 
Where it can be calculated the R2 value increases significantly, indicative of a higher level of 
explained variation in the models. It is difficult to know what to include in multivariate regressions of 
                                                          
15
 A supporting economic argument for increased resources for mental health has been recently made by 
Knapp and Lemmi (2014). 
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life satisfaction, and data often plays a key role in what can be chosen. Given current datasets it may 
not always be possible to include thoughts about the future in well-being models. Where possible, 
the results of this analysis suggest that thoughts about the future should be included. Given the size 
of the effect, the likely gender difference (such thoughts seemingly affect males more than females), 
and the role in explaining variation in life satisfaction, thoughts about the future should be 
considered for inclusion even if they are not of direct interest. They are likely to be important 
control variables. 
Two of the models employed use General Method of Moments to obtain coefficient values, for the 
explicit purpose of treating optimism and pessimism as potentially endogenous. Such a technique 
creates instruments that are (hopefully) correlated with the potentially endogenous variable but not 
with the idiosyncratic error term; diagnostic testing demonstrates that the generated instruments 
fulfil this criteria. The use of GMM is unusual in the well-being literature though it has much to offer 
investigators of life satisfaction, including this ability to treat explanatory variables as potentially 
endogenous. GMM has proved useful in many areas of economic investigation, and should be more 
widely considered in the economics of happiness literature. 
Economics deals largely with objective factors (unemployment, marriage) and assesses their direct 
association with well-being. The analysis above indicates that subjective factors are also important 
and should also be considered, whether directly or as a control variable, in future investigations of 
well-being. With GMM, scholars have more ability to address these potentially important subjective 
factors. This may mean that future datasets should also try to include more subjective questions too: 
the inner life of individuals is likely to be as important for a satisfaction with life as objective factors. 
An enhanced understanding of life satisfaction needs to include both subjective and objective 
elements of an individual’s life. As is very often the case, more research would be useful and 
informative. 
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Table 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE RE RE 
       
Optimistic  0.45***  0.24***  0.37*** 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.014) 
Quite Pessimistic  -0.66***  -0.40***  -0.54*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
Pessimistic  -1.36***  -0.81***  -1.10*** 
  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Log Real Income 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
Married 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.030) (0.012) (0.017) 
Divorced -0.15*** -0.10*** 0.05* -0.01 -0.11*** -0.10*** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.025) (0.044) (0.019) (0.027) 
Separated -0.43*** -0.47*** -0.26*** -0.33*** -0.37*** -0.44*** 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.029) (0.052) (0.025) (0.040) 
Widowed -0.03 0.07 -0.17*** -0.13 -0.15*** -0.02 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.050) (0.087) (0.036) (0.051) 
Self-employed -0.08*** -0.13*** 0.00 -0.05 -0.02* -0.09*** 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.015) (0.022) 
Gov employed 0.18*** 0.16*** -0.01 0.00 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.033) (0.058) (0.022) (0.030) 
Apprentice 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.09** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.021) (0.040) (0.018) (0.029) 
Unemployed -0.89*** -0.83*** -0.68*** -0.69*** -0.75*** -0.77*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.027) (0.014) (0.023) 
Retired 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.01 0.12** 0.03 0.10*** 
 (0.024) (0.038) (0.025) (0.048) (0.022) (0.037) 
Health: V good 2.36*** 1.99*** 1.38*** 1.25*** 1.70*** 1.69*** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.029) (0.014) (0.023) 
Health: Good 1.72*** 1.47*** 1.05*** 0.96*** 1.26*** 1.26*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.018) 
Health: Satisfact 0.93*** 0.81*** 0.63*** 0.58*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018) 
Educat: High 0.13*** 0.05** 0.03 -0.01 0.17*** 0.10*** 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.025) (0.046) (0.017) (0.024) 
Educat: Medium 0.04*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.08** 0.06*** 0.02 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.035) (0.013) (0.019) 
Age 21-30 0.08*** -0.00 -0.05*** -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.012) (0.018) 
Age: 31-40 -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.05*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.014) 
Age: 51-60 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.025) (0.010) (0.016) 
Age: 61plus 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.46*** 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.025) (0.048) (0.019) (0.029) 
Constant 5.27*** 5.98*** 6.29*** 6.59*** 5.28*** 5.32*** 
 (0.046) (0.079) (0.102) (0.222) (0.037) (0.047) 
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Supporting information for table 1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Observations 214, 637 77,911 214, 637 77,911 214,637 77,911 
Individuals - - 34,208 25,168 34,208 25,168 
R2 (Overall) 0.212 0.276 0.183 0.248 0.206 0.273 
R2 (Between) - - 0.217 0.300 0.260 0.339 
R2 (Within) - - 0.081 0.110 0.078 0.106 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all columns include region and wave 
dummy variables. Base categories are as follows: single, employed, poor health, low education, age 
15-20, quite optimistic.  
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Table 2:  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)   
VARIABLES 
Males 
 (Static GMM) 
Females 
 (Static GMM) 
Males  
(Dynamic GMM)  
Females 
(Dynamic GMM) 
Lagged Life Satisfaction   0.08*** 0.09*** 
   (0.017) (0.018) 
Optimistic 1.10* 0.84* 1.00** 0.96** 
 (0.661) (0.474) (0.441) (0.463) 
Quite Pessimistic -0.14 -0.30 -0.10 -0.13 
 (0.637) (0.307) (0.261) (0.276) 
Pessimistic -2.32*** -1.08* -1.76*** -1.36** 
 (0.717) (0.576) (0.534) (0.569) 
Log Real Income 0.16*** 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.04** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) 
Married 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.20*** 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.037) (0.044) 
Divorced -0.14* -0.09 -0.14** -0.08 
 (0.074) (0.069) (0.071) (0.067) 
Separated -0.58*** -0.21** -0.53*** -0.21** 
 (0.112) (0.104) (0.117) (0.109) 
Widowed 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.14 
 (0.137) (0.100) (0.130) (0.096) 
Self-employed -0.27*** -0.03 -0.25*** -0.03 
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.047) (0.060) 
Gov employed 0.22*** 0.14* 0.19*** 0.15** 
 (0.056) (0.080) (0.053) (0.074) 
Apprentice 0.12 0.05 0.13* -0.00 
 (0.073) (0.071) (0.074) (0.072) 
Unemployed -0.71*** -0.68*** -0.72*** -0.65*** 
 (0.071) (0.065) (0.069) (0.064) 
Retired 0.17** -0.07 0.16** -0.05 
 (0.079) (0.094) (0.076) (0.094) 
Health: V good 1.51*** 1.67*** 1.50*** 1.58*** 
 (0.114) (0.090) (0.084) (0.083) 
Health: Good 1.17*** 1.25*** 1.14*** 1.20*** 
 (0.075) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) 
Health: Satisfact 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.69*** 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Educat: Medium 0.06 0.04 0.07* 0.04 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.038) (0.041) 
Educat: High 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.08 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.049) (0.054) 
Age 21-30 -0.29*** -0.16** -0.25*** -0.13* 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) 
Age: 31-40 -0.41*** -0.28*** -0.35*** -0.22*** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.084) (0.086) 
Age: 41-50 -0.39*** -0.27*** -0.33*** -0.21** 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.089) (0.091) 
Age: 51-60 -0.14 -0.03 -0.11 0.02 
 (0.097) (0.099) (0.090) (0.096) 
Age: 61plus 0.25** 0.46*** 0.24** 0.47*** 
 (0.111) (0.139) (0.104) (0.136) 
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Supporting information for table 2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
5.10*** 
(0.277) 
5.39*** 
(0.150) 
4.46*** 
(0.212) 
4.77*** 
(0.196) 
Observations 
 
23,769 17,905 22,464 16,948 
Individuals 
 
 7,482  6,153  7,158  5,886 
Instruments used 
 
44 59 72 72 
AR(2) 
 
* * * * 
Hansen C test 
 
0.568 0.604 0.412 0.850 
Exogenous 
instruments  
0.443 0.903 Covered by the 
other tests 
Covered by the 
other tests 
Hansen J test  
(lag dep var) 
N/A N/A 0.412 0.745 
Hansen J test 
(for levels) 
N/A N/A 0.629 0.877 
Future dummies 
exogeneity 
Covered by the 
other tests 
Covered by the 
other tests 
0.402 0.847 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all columns include region dummy 
variables. Base categories are as follows: single, employed, poor health, low education, age 15-20, 
quite optimistic. In each column the variables treated as endogenous are the optimism-pessimism 
variables; the lag lengths employed for instrument creation are the first two available for the first 
column and all available for the other columns (a choice made, as described in the text, because of 
the diagnostic test results). 
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Appendix 1 
The impact of individual perceptions about the future across Europe on happiness and life 
satisfaction: raw correlations from the ESS round 6 (2012) 
 
The latest round of the ESS can also provide an illustration of the role of optimism and pessimism for 
happiness and life satisfaction (which, in the ESS, are asked about separately). One question in the 
ESS asks directly about happiness. The question ‘taking all things together, how happy would you say 
you are?’ is answered with an eleven point scale from 0, extremely unhappy, to 10, extremely 
happy.  The life satisfaction question is similar and asks individuals how satisfied they are with life as 
a whole also with an eleven point scale (0 being extremely dissatisfied and 10 being extremely 
satisfied). The explanatory variable used asks people about their confidence regarding the future, 
and simple regressions were undertaken to investigate a relationship between this and happiness, 
and life satisfaction. However, because of the cross-section nature of the dataset, analysis is 
presented here only as an illustration.  Countries in the sample are put into a category based on the 
statistical significance (or its lack) with respect to the dependent variable (happiness or life 
satisfaction). The directions of the associations are as expected. 
 
Significant explanatory 
variables 
Happiness Life Satisfaction 
 
Future looks positive (+); future 
looks bleak (-) 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
France 
Germany 
Great Britain 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Russia 
Slovenia  
Spain 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
France  
Germany 
Kosovo 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Russia 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Future looks positive only (+) Czech Republic 
Finland 
Lithuania 
Norway 
Slovakia  
Albania 
Finland 
Lithuania 
Slovakia 
Future looks bleak only (-) Albania  
Denmark 
Iceland 
Portugal  
Cyprus  
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Spain 
Neither variable Cyprus 
Kosovo 
Israel 
Italy 
Poland 
Switzerland 
Ukraine 
Great Britain 
Switzerland 
Iceland 
Israel 
Poland 
Ukraine 
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Appendix 2 
Descriptive statistics from the SOEP sample 
 
 Range Optimistic 
Rather 
Optimistic 
Rather 
Pessimistic Pessimistic Overall 
Variable       
Life satisfaction 0 - 10 7.73 7.20 6.32 5.29 6.89 
Real income 0 - 1080 17.55 17.35 13.40 9.63 15.66 
Single 0 - 1 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.16 0.23 
Married 0 - 1 0.55 0.62 0.66 0.61 0.62 
Divorced 0 - 1 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.06 
Separated 0 - 1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Widowed 0 - 1 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.06 
Self employed 0 - 1 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Employed 0 - 1 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.36 0.47 
Gov employed 0 - 1 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Apprentice 0 - 1 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Unemployed 0 - 1 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.06 
Retired 0 - 1 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.37 0.23 
Not in lab mkt 0 - 1 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Very good health 0 - 1 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.10 
Good health 0 - 1 0.48 0.46 0.32 0.22 0.41 
Satisfactory health 0 - 1 0.23 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.33 
Poor health 0 - 1 0.08 0.12 0.25 0.41 0.17 
Education: high 0 - 1 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.17 
Education: medium 0 - 1 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.62 
Education: low 0 - 1 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.21 
Age: 15-20 0 - 1 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 
Age: 21-30 0 - 1 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.17 
Age 31: 40 0 - 1 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.19 
Age: 41-50 0 - 1 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.18 
Age: 51-60 0 - 1 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.16 
Age: 61 plus 0 - 1 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.22 
 
 
 
